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Turning the Corner: 
The Origins of Daniel Ellsberg’s Moral Rejection of the Vietnam War 
 
On April 2, 1968, Daniel Ellsberg traveled to Princeton University to attend an 
anti-war conference cosponsored by the American Friends Service Committee and the 
Woodrow Wilson School. The conference, titled “America in a Revolutionary World,” 
lasted three days and drew participants from all corners of the broad anti-war coalition 
that had come together to oppose American involvement in Vietnam. This diverse array 
of activists and organizations included members of the antinuclear movement of the 
1950s, members of the civil rights movement from the 1960s, committed pacifists that 
had resisted the draft since the Korean War and World War II, adherents to Gandhian 
nonviolent philosophy, and even Tom Hayden, the famed founder of the Students for a 
Democratic Society organization.1 Despite their varying backgrounds, philosophies, and 
motivations, these activists were all brought together by their abhorrence of the Vietnam 
War and commitment to ending the American presence there.  
Daniel Ellsberg, however, did not travel to Princeton as an activist looking to end 
the Vietnam War. He was at the conference as a professional counterrevolutionary, well 
practiced in arguing the government line at antiwar teach-ins and conferences, with the 
credentials and experience of a seasoned cold warrior. Ellsberg had worked in the 
Defense Department during 1964 and 1965, the years in which the Johnson 
 
1 Secrets, 209. 
Administration had dramatically escalated American involvement in Vietnam. He then 
traveled to Vietnam in 1965 as a member of the State Department and spent two years 
working on “pacification,” which, in Ellsberg’s own assessment, could have been defined 
as rural counterrevolution.2 Upon his return to the United States and at the time of the 
April 2, 1968 Princeton antiwar conference, Ellsberg was a RAND Corporation analyst 
that consulted with high-level US government officials on how to break through the 
stalemate and win the war in Vietnam. 
However, unbeknownst to his employers and to the committed antiwar activists 
that surrounded him at the conference, Ellsberg’s views on Vietnam had begun to shift. 
While he may have traveled to Princeton in his capacity as a professional 
counterrevolutionary, he was no longer thinking like one. After four years of studying 
Vietnam as a government insider and even traveling to Vietnam itself to conduct 
extensive field research, Ellsberg saw the war as unwinnable.3 The conflict could be 
prolonged indefinitely, but the best that the United States could salvage from this 
grueling stalemate were lessons of failure. 
Notably, in all of Ellsberg’s analysis and writing on the war prior to April 2, 1968, 
he never engaged with the morality of the war itself. He occasionally states a concern that 
the United States may be perceived as immoral if they continue to indiscriminately shell 
Vietnam, burn down villages, and force peasants to relocate, but these concerns are only 
in connection to the stated American goal of winning hearts and minds in Vietnam.4 
None of Ellsberg’s writing questions the morality of the war itself or asks whether the 
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4 Johnson, "Remarks at a Dinner Meeting of the Texas Electric Cooperatives, Inc." An early 
example of President Johnson stating his aim to win hearts and minds in Vietnam. 
United States has a right to be in Vietnam in the first place. This absence is notable 
because of Ellsberg’s justification for later leaking and publishing the Pentagon Papers in 
1971. He came to see the conflict as a war of American aggression and a moral wrong 
that had to be stopped, even if that meant betraying his colleagues in the government and 
at RAND and even risking life in prison.5  
The origins of this moral transformation can be traced to that Princeton antiwar 
conference in April of 1968, and specifically to the influence of a young woman named 
Janaki Tschannerl.  
On April 2nd, the first day of the conference, Ellsberg was eating lunch during the 
midday break in the “America in a Revolutionary World” programming. During this 
break, a young woman sat across the lunch table from Ellsberg who had immediately 
caught his eye because of her distinct appearance. She was from the Madras region in the 
South of India and wore a sari and a dot of red dust on her forehead, representing the 
footprint of God.6 Ellsberg made an effort not to stare or eavesdrop on the young 
woman’s conversation, but quickly changed his stance when he heard her say, “I come 
from a culture in which there is no concept of enemy.” Ellsberg, a trained academic that 
would explore and analyze new ideas with remarkable vigor and zeal, had to know more. 
He found this statement to be “hardly comprehensible,”7 and explained in his memoir:  
I came from a culture in which the concept of enemy was central, seemingly 
indispensable—the culture of RAND, the U.S. Marine Corps, the Defense and 
State departments, international and domestic politics, game theory and 
bargaining theory... To try to operate in the world of men and nations without the 
concept of enemy would have seemed as difficult, as nearly inconceivable as 
doing arithmetic, like the Romans, without zero.8   
 
5 Secrets, 257. 
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8 Ibid. 
 
Rather than dismissing this novel world view as ridiculous or far fetched, Ellsberg, in line 
with his nature as an insatiably curious intellectual, followed up with the young woman. 
The two of them met the next morning and were quickly immersed in deep conversation, 
skipping a full day of the conference and talking into the night.9  
 Ellsberg learned that the woman’s name was Janaki Tschannerl and that she had 
spent many years working in the sarvodaya movement in India, which strove for rural 
transformation through constructive action in line with Gandhi’s teachings. According to 
these teachings, no human being should be regarded as an enemy that you have a right to 
hate, destroy, or regard as evil, because all people have goodness within them and can be 
learned from. Even if a person’s actions in the present moment could be rightfully 
regarded as harmful, dangerous, or evil, the person could not be.10 
 Janaki explained to Ellsberg that this did not mean accepting evil actions or 
harmful conduct. In fact, Gandhi advocated exactly the opposite. Terrible wrongs 
required resistance that was militant yet nonviolent, even at great personal cost or the risk 
of one’s life. This nonviolent resistance could take the form of noncooperation, 
obstruction, and most notably, “exposure: truth telling, acting out the truth of one’s sense 
of human rights, and wrongs, relinquishing silence that can be interpreted as, and 
amounts to, acceptance and support.”11 When Ellsberg later released the Pentagon Papers 
in 1971, he was using the power of truth telling to expose the reality of American 
involvement in Vietnam and nonviolently oppose the war. Just as explained by Janaki in 
1968, that act can come at great personal risk; for leaking the Pentagon Papers, Ellsberg 
 
9 Secrets, 212. 
10 Secrets, 213. 
11 Ibid. 
was prosecuted by the U.S. government and faced the possibility of a 115-year prison 
sentence. 
 When Ellsberg first heard Janaki mention a worldview without the concept of 
“enemy”, it seemed inconceivable, almost impossible, like attempting to do arithmetic 
without zero. Yet after spending hours learning from Janaki about the philosophy of 
nonviolence, Ellsberg came away with a new understanding. He found nonviolent 
resistance to be “a surprisingly coherent doctrine with a relevant body of experience 
supporting it.”12 Gandhian philosophy was no longer impossible or naïve in Ellsberg’s 
eyes but was instead “intellectually challenging, plausible, a new way of understanding 
problems and possibilities,”13 with human morality lying at the very center of it all.  
 At the conclusion of the Princeton antiwar conference, Ellsberg flew back to the 
RAND Corporation headquarters in Santa Monica and worked on his prospectus for 
personal research on Vietnam, focusing on what could be learned from American 
failures. This proposal was submitted to Henry Rowen and Charles Wolf just two weeks 
after Ellsberg met Janaki. Critically, in outlining the failures of U.S. policy in Vietnam, 
Ellsberg included the following section: 
7. Morality of means. Developments in Vietnam that raise the issue of morality, 
and attitudes and considerations that condition judgment of relative moral 
acceptability; the potential impact of moral judgments on U.S. policy, in conduct 
or intervention in counterinsurgency; basis for judging specific practices of the 
U.S. or its Allies (and the VC) ‘immoral;’ consequences of such judgments, in 
internal U.S. affairs and its foreign relations.14 
 
This passage does not revolve around recognition of a shared humanity as a Gandhian 
teaching does, nor does it deliver a critique of how the American system perpetuates this 
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immoral conduct against the will of the people. It does, however, align with messages 
found in the broad coalition of the anti-war left and reflect the Gandhian ideology that 
Ellsberg had been exposed to just weeks prior. In this research prospectus, Ellsberg is 
asking central questions of right and wrong that were completely absent from his analysis 
while at the State Department from 1964-65 and similarly omitted from his field research 
in Vietnam from 1965-1967. Is what we’re doing in Vietnam immoral? How can we 
measure the morality of our actions? If what we’re doing is immoral, or is seen as 
immoral, what might the consequences of that be? Can we afford to keep treating the 
Vietnamese people, who we have deemed our enemy, this way? 
These questions naturally feed into the next section of Ellsberg’s prospectus, 
which analyzes how to avoid intervening in such situations. He asserts the need for “a 
realistic assessment of U.S. ignorance, in its various forms; reassessment of the past, 
perceived aims and general arguments for intervention.”15 Ellsberg then recounts a series 
of these arguments made under the shroud of ignorance, all of which are framed around 
defeating a series of enemies: “domino theory, challenge of Chicoms, importance of 
outside -- DRV -- support to VC insurgency, perceptions of the nature and impact of 
Communist rule and its practical alternatives, feasibility and effectiveness of various 
forms of U.S. intervention.”16  
Each of these steps and rationales was accepted as a necessary measure to defeat 
the enemy, who were seen by the U.S. government as evil figures without legitimate 
motivations or redeeming qualities, whether they be the Soviet Union (as seen in the 
“domino theory” rationale), the Chinese Communists (the “Chicoms”), the Viet Cong 
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(“VC insurgency”), or the communist ideology as a whole. The American system of 
analysis made all of its assumptions in a manner antithetical to the Gandhian view of 
conflict. The enemy was evil and must therefore be destroyed. 
Ellsberg and Janaki kept in touch following the Princeton antiwar conference and 
became close friends, frequently speaking on the phone and writing letters, which 
continued to influence Ellsberg’s political thinking.17 Ellsberg began to thoroughly 
review pacifist and Gandhian literature at RAND, prompted by a series of 
recommendations that Janaki had provided, and attended more antiwar conferences on 
Janaki’s invitation.18  
Through exposure to the anti-war movement, Gandhian doctrine, and nonviolent 
teachings, Daniel Ellsberg continued to ask new questions and change his views on the 
Vietnam War. While Ellsberg never returned to Vietnam to gather field data, he 
continued to alter the framework through which he analyzed information that he had 
already gathered. These new perspectives on the American involvement in Vietnam 
increasingly involved questions of morality, complicity, and how governmental decision 
makers regarded the Vietnamese people. The Princeton Conference was a critical step in 
this transformation. Ellsberg arrived “professional counterrevolutionary” and left 
contemplating the power of noncooperation and truth telling in the face of injustice. This 
framework of morality and resistance proved pivotal in Ellsberg’s 1971 release of the 
Pentagon Papers and the life of nonviolent resistance and activism that he has led ever 
since. 
 
17 Wild Man, 308. 
18 Wild Man, 309. The literature recommendations include: Stride Toward Freedom by King, The 
Conquest of Violence by Joan Bondurant, Revolution and Equilibrium by Barbara Deming, “On 
the Duty of Civil Disobedience” by Henry David Thoreau 
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